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Background: To guide policy and control measures, decent scientific data are needed for a comprehensive
assessment of epidemiological, clinical and virological characteristics of the First Few hundred (FF100) cases. We
discuss the feasibility of the FF100 approach during the 2009 pandemic and the added value compared with
alternative data sources available.
Methods: The pandemic preparedness plan enabled us to perform a case–control study, assessing patient
characteristics and risk factors for experiencing symptomatic influenza A(H1N1)2009 infection and providing insight
into transmission. We assessed to what extent timely and novel data were generated compared to other available
data sources.
Results: In May-December 2009, a total of 68 cases and 48 controls were included in the study. Underlying
non-respiratory diseases were significantly more common among cases compared to controls, while a protective
effect was found for frequent hand washing. Seroconversion was found for 7/30 controls (23%), and persisting high
titers for 4/30 controls (13%). The labour-intensive study design resulted in slow and restricted recruitment.
Conclusions: The findings of our case–control study gave new insights in transmission risks and possible
interventions for improved control. Nevertheless, the FF100 approach lacked timeliness and power due to limited
recruitment. For future pandemics we suggest pooling data from several countries, to enable collecting sufficient
data in a relatively short period.Background
The worldwide increase in the incidence of influenza
caused by avian influenza viruses since 1997, both in
poultry and humans, introduced the potential for an-
other influenza pandemic and the need for pandemic
preparedness plans [1-4]. Comprehensive assessment of
the First Few Hundred (FF100) cases to timely character-
ise clinical, virological and epidemiological features and
for risk factor information is an important part of these
plans. Despite the continuing threat of avian influenza
viruses, the first official influenza pandemic in the 21st* Correspondence: Rianne.van.Gageldonk@rivm.nl
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumcentury was caused by the so-called influenza A(H1N1)
2009 virus. In the Netherlands, as elsewhere, initial rapid
assessments of the impact of this new influenza virus on
the human population have been based on case-studies
of the first notified laboratory confirmed cases [5,6].
These studies provided vital information to guide man-
agement, but more standardised and detailed informa-
tion was still needed to guide control activities, to
underpin policy decisions and for communication with
the general public and the media. The Dutch pandemic
preparedness plan included a generic study protocol and
questionnaires to rapidly collect detailed key epidemio-
logical, clinical, virological and immunological data of a
limited number (approximately one hundred) of the
earliest patients and their close contacts. The design of
this FF100 cases and contacts approach enabled a case–
control study aiming at identifying patient characteristicsBioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of
tp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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enza A(H1N1) 2009 infection in the general Dutch
population, and made it possible to get the insight into
the transmission of the influenza virus. This is in con-
trast to other studies and FF100 approaches, which fo-
cused on cases only and were therefore dependant on
ecological analysis for risk factor analysis.
This report summarises the findings from the case–
control study with respect to risk factors for symptom-
atic infection and transmission. Moreover, the FF100
cases and contacts approach is discussed in terms of the
feasibility during the 2009 pandemic and the added sci-
entific value compared with alternative data sources
available. We will go into the difficulties of performing
this approach real time and the lessons learned.Methods
Study design
A comprehensive generic study protocol for detailed data
collection was written following the 2003 outbreak of in-
fluenza A(H7N7) among poultry in the Netherlands
[7,8], and approved beforehand by the Medical Ethical
Review Committee of the University Medical Center Ut-
recht in 2007. In May 2009, the protocol was adapted to
the situation of the pandemic threat at that time and
again approved by the same Medical Ethical Review
Committee. The study started in June 2009, and was per-
formed by the Centre for Infectious Disease Control
(CIb) of the National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment (RIVM), in collaboration with Public
Health Services (PHS), a network of academic medical
centres and the network of general practitioners (GPs)
from the Continuous Morbidity Registration Sentinel
General Practice Network of the Netherlands institute
for health services research (NIVEL).Table 1 Study schedule of the case–control study in the perio
influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus infection at the 15th of August
Day 0 Day
Up to 15 August 2009 visit1 visit2
case patients nose- and throat swab* X
venipuncture X^
control subjects nose- and throat swab X
venipuncture X
From 15 August 2009 GP visit visit1
case patients nose- and throat swab X^ X
venipuncture X^ # X
control subjects nose- and throat swab X
venipuncture X
* The diagnostic nose- and throat swab on which the patients were included in the
entered in the schedule.
^ For hospitalised cases the first visits, until the moment of discharge, were schedu
# The GP took a finger prick instead of a venipuncture.Cases and controls
Initially, laboratory-confirmed cases as well as controls
were recruited via the PHS using the national mandatory
notification system. Since the 15th of August, the notifica-
tion criteria were limited from all possible, probable and
laboratory-confirmed cases to hospitalised or deceased
laboratory-confirmed cases. Therefore, the recruitment of
study participants was continued in collaboration with
GPs from the Continuous Morbidity Registration Sentinel
General Practice Network of the NIVEL [6]. The selection
and inclusion of cases is described in more detail by
Friesema et al [9]. Contacts were defined as persons who
had close contact with the case in the early stage of infec-
tion, and who had no symptoms of ILI at the time of
inclusion in the study. They were approached for par-
ticipation in the study at the moment patients were
informed about the study. These contacts were consid-
ered as controls matched for exposure to influenza
A(H1N1) 2009 virus. Controls developing symptoms of
ILI during the period of follow up were maintained as
controls according to the study design.Data collection
After consenting, both cases and controls were visited by
a research nurse at day 0 (within 8 days from the onset of
disease). During this first visit the study objectives were
further clarified, the case and control information was
handed over, and written informed consent was obtained
from both the case and control(s). As shown in Table 1,
data collection was carried out at days 0, 5, 10 and 30.
From the 15th of August onwards, the first GP consult-
ation was counted as the day 0-visit for cases and the first
home visit for controls was scheduled at day 5. For cases
as well as controls, the number and type of samples taken
before and after the 15th of August were the same, withd before and after the change of notification criteria for
2009, the Netherlands
5 range [4-6] Day 10 range [9-11] Day 30 range [28–35]
visit3 visit4
X
X X
X X
visit2 visit3
X
X X
X X
study was taken by the physician of the municipal health service and is not
led in hospital.
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cases taken at the GP visit. The same schedule was also
applied for hospitalised cases and their controls. During
hospitalisation, the study was carried out in the hospital
by the attending physician. After discharge, the remaining
home visits were taken over by a research nurse.
Both cases and controls were asked to complete a
detailed questionnaire. This questionnaire included ques-
tions about demographics, medical history, use of medi-
cation, exposure to influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus,
symptoms of the current episode, and hygiene aspects.
Real-time RT-PCR for detection of pandemic influenza
A(H1N1) 2009 virus in combined nose and throat swabs
and serology was done as described previously [10,11].
Seroconversion was defined as a change in titre from no
hemagglutination inhibition to a titre ≥1:40, or as having
a four-fold or greater rise in titres between two succes-
sive samples.
Statistical analyses
Multivariate logistic regression analysis was used to
examine whether patient characteristics and/or potential
risk factors were associated with a laboratory-confirmed
symptomatic infection. The dependent variable was
symptomatic disease (i.e. being a case or control). Vari-
ables with a P-value≤ 0.10 in the univariate model were
included in the multivariate model. Backward selection
was used to identify covariates that were independently
associated with symptomatic disease. Significant odds
ratios (ORs) were presented with 95% confidence inter-
vals (95% CI).
Insight in transmission was obtained by studying the
serology results for controls. These analyses were
restricted to controls of whom at least two blood sam-
ples were available. Persisting high titers (≥ 1/40) in the
first and following blood samples were considered as a0
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Figure 1 Age distribution of cases and controls of the case–control st
Netherlands, 2009.proxy for exposure to the same source as the case, while
seroconversion was considered as a proxy for secondary
transmission whereby the case acts as probable source
for the control.
With respect to the feasibility of our study design dur-
ing the 2009 pandemic, we assessed the number and
timing of inclusion of patients willing to participate in
the study versus the total number of notified influenza
A(H1N1) 2009 virus infections in relation to the timing
of notifications. Furthermore the age distribution of
included patients was compared with that of the notified
patients. The added value of the used approach was
explored by comparing the findings of the case–control
study with alternative data sources. Statistical analyses
were performed using SAS version 9.2 (SAS Institute).
Results
Between June and December 2009 a total of 76 of 120
invited patients were willing to participate in the study
(63%). Written informed consent and a completed ques-
tionnaire were received for 68 of these cases, as well as
for 48 controls. The response rate for controls could not
be assessed, since no information about the number of
approached controls was available. Next to the question-
naire, at least one combined nose and throat swab was
available for all cases and at least one blood sample for
32 cases (47%). For the controls these numbers were 34
(71%) and 33 (69%), respectively. The age distribution of
cases and controls is shown in Figure 1.
The median age of cases (26 years, range: 5–67 years)
was significantly lower than that of controls (45 years,
range: 7–67 years). Underlying lung disorders, including
asthma, COPD, and cystic fibrosis, were reported by 28%
of the cases and 25% of the controls (p = 0.7). Underlying
non-respiratory diseases, including various disorders like
cardiovascular disorders, immunological disorders and35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
up (years)
case patients
control subjects
udy during the influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic in the
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5% of the controls (p = 0.04).
Risk factors
Cases and controls were compared with respect to
reported medical history, smoking, antiviral treatment,
seasonal influenza vaccination status, and current hygiene
aspects to assess which variables were independently asso-
ciated with symptomatic disease. Multivariate logistic re-
gression analyses, adjusted for age and gender, showed
that underlying non-respiratory diseases (including car-
diovascular disorders, immunological disorders and dia-
betes mellitus) were significantly more common among
cases compared to controls (OR=9.7; 95%CI: 1.6-57.9).
Next to this, a protective effect of frequent (≥8 times a day)
hand washing was found (OR=0.37; 95%CI: 0.15-0.90).
Transmission
Seroconversion was found for seven of the 30 controls
(23%), of whom at least two blood samples (minimal
8 days apart) were available. For three of these seven
controls the PCR of the combined nose and throat swab,
taken at the inclusion in the study, was positive.
Persisting high titers in the first and following blood
samples were found for four of the 30 controls (13%).
For one of them the PCR, taken at the inclusion in the
study, was positive. For a total of 19 controls (63%) no
serological response was found.
FF100 cases and contacts approach
Inclusion of the required number of cases and contacts
during the period of influenza activity in the Netherlands
lagged behind the notified cases reported to the national
mandatory notification system. By the time the first hun-
dred patients were notified, 2 cases were recruited, and
by the time 200 patients were notified, 14 cases were
recruited. Figure 2 shows the number of included
patients willing to participate in relation to the number
of notified patients.0
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A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic in the Netherlands, 2009.About 50% of the cases were included via the PHS be-
fore the 15th of August. The remaining 50% was included
via the GPs from the NIVEL network. Three of the par-
ticipating cases were admitted to hospital, of which two
were included through the participating academic med-
ical centres. The inclusion of hospitalised cases could
only start a median of 153 days after the approval of the
baseline protocol, because it was necessary to obtain ap-
proval of the study protocol by the Medical Ethical Re-
view Committees of the individual academic centres.
All age groups were represented in the case–control
study (Figure 1), and the age distribution of the included
cases corresponds to that of the first 115 laboratory-
confirmed cases in the Netherlands [5].
The control/case ratio in the case–control study was
0.7 (48/68), indicating we included less than one control
per case. The inclusion of children as control was in par-
ticular difficult, as indicated by the significantly higher
median age of controls compared to cases.
Discussion
The Dutch FF100 case–control was unique in including
controls alongside cases and observed an increased risk
of symptomatic infection among those with non-
respiratory underlying conditions, while frequent hand
washing was found to be protective. In addition, sero-
logical results indicated that nearly a quarter of exposed
contacts had evidence of secondary transmission rate.
However, the labour-intensive design was logistically ex-
tremely challenging during times of intense work pres-
sure, resulting in slow and limited recruitment, and
results might have been biased by the low number of
included cases and controls. Despite intensive prepared-
ness planning the added value of the comprehensive as-
sessment of the FF100 cases and contacts during the
2009 influenza pandemic in the Netherlands was less
than expected due to limited number of participants
underlying the novel observations and the delay in re-
cruitment of both cases and controls.37 38 39 40 O
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symptomatic infection in patients with underlying non-
respiratory diseases. This is in contrast with several other
studies observing that established risk factors for compli-
cations of seasonal influenza were also associated with
severe illness from influenza A(H1N1) 2009 infection
[6,12-20]. However, these studies differ to our study in
both the study design and outcomes, making valid com-
parisons practically impossible. Most of these studies
were case-based studies without a control group. Besides,
they mainly focussed on risk factors for severe outcomes
of influenza, while we studied risk factors for symptom-
atic infection. Frequent hand washing appeared to have a
protective effect on symptomatic infection. Assuming
that daily hand washing frequency is a proxy of the hand
hygiene in general, this finding suggests that hand hy-
giene may reduce the transmission of pandemic influ-
enza virus. This is in agreement with recent studies
suggesting that hand hygiene prevents transmission of
influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus in households and
crowded communities [21-24]. However, heightened at-
tention to hygienic behaviour for controls facing a dis-
eased relative or friend may have caused recall bias in
the present study. The results of these analyses could
have been influenced by differences in the severity of dis-
ease between extramural and hospitalised patients, but
exclusion of hospitalised patients led to similar results.
Based on serological responses of the controls included
in our study, the secondary transmission rate was over
20%. This is in line with Cowling et al. [23], reporting a
fourfold or greater rise in antibody titer in about one
fifth of the household contacts, although no distinction
was made between pandemic and seasonal influenza
virus in that study. The persistently high titers found in
four controls in our study, might indicate that they had
been exposed to the same source as their case. For at
least one control this assumption is supported by a posi-
tive PCR at inclusion in the study, although a cross re-
active response can not be excluded.
The addition of the FF100 cases and contact approach
to the comprehensive assessment of the Dutch pandemic
preparedness plan was based on the experiences of the
2003 outbreak of influenza A(H7N7) among poultry in
the Netherlands [7,8]. Rapid and structured collection of
detailed epidemiological, clinical, virological and im-
munological data appeared to be essential for the man-
agement of control activities and for communication.
The inclusion of both cases with relatively mild symp-
tomatic infection and of close contacts is a strength of
the FF100 cases and contacts approach. Most studies on
influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus so far concern case-series,
mainly including severe cases and most studies on risk
factors focused on a serious outcome of disease caused
by influenza A(H1N1) 2009 infection [6,12-16,25,26].Moreover, the inclusion of contacts improved the insight
in both risk factors for symptomatic infection in the gen-
eral Dutch population and in the transmission of pan-
demic influenza A(H1N1) virus to close contacts.
Nevertheless, the course of the 2009 pandemic and the
resulting workload made it impossible to include the
intended first few hundred cases and contacts in a lim-
ited period of time, which is a substantial limitation of
our study. Since the influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus had
already spread internationally before it was recognised,
the implementation of containment and mitigation mea-
sures was practically impossible, resulting in a rapid in-
crease of the number of cases worldwide [27]. Following
the restriction of the mandatory notification in the Neth-
erlands on the 15th of August 2009 [6], only a relatively
small number of cases and controls were available for in-
clusion in the study. Moreover, the public perception of
the pandemic changed when it became clear that the
majority of patients developed mild disease, and there-
fore patients were less willing to participate in the study.
This is in line with findings in the FF100 cases project in
the UK. McLean et al. [28] also showed that initially al-
most all laboratory-confirmed cases were included in the
‘first few 100 project’ in the UK, but as the case numbers
began to increase, the proportion of cases included also
decreased.
Nevertheless, the UK FF100 project did succeed to
identify key clinical and epidemiological characteristics
of infection with the pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus
in near real-time, although the lack of controls suggests
that some caution is needed in the interpretation. The
higher number of participants might partly be explained
by the significant pandemic spring wave in England com-
pared to the Netherlands, which provided many more
opportunities for PHS’s to approach people. Also, the ab-
sence of the inclusion of controls would make approach-
ing and consenting a more smooth process.
We acknowledge there are some further limitations
to our design. First, questionnaire data were used to re-
port patient characteristics and to measure exposure to
potential risk factors. This could be less reliable com-
pared with observational data. Moreover, heightened at-
tention to the cause of their complaints by cases may
have caused recall bias. Secondly, we cannot rule out
the possibility that controls were in the incubation
period for infection, even though they had no respira-
tory complaints at the moment of inclusion. This, in
combination with the limited sample size, might have
diluted the investigated relations between symptomatic
disease and patient characteristics as well as potential
risk factors.
Despite the slow and limited recruitment, the FF100 cases
and contact approach is well-suited for rapid and detailed
collection of epidemiological, clinical, virological and
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based data. This is also shown by the FF100 cases project in
the UK [28]. The UK was one of the first European countries
affected and experienced a substantial first wave in spring
and summer 2009. Their FF100 cases project was rapidly
established and captured information on almost 400 of the
first UK cases in the first 7 weeks of the pandemic; 37% of
all cases reported in that period [28].
For future pandemics we therefore suggest that several
countries share the same comprehensive baseline study
protocol to rapidly collect detailed epidemiological, clinical,
virological and immunological data of the first few hun-
dred cases as well as their close contacts. This will facilitate
the possibility pooling the data, and therefore increase the
number of both cases and close contacts resulting in more
timely data and more power to strengthen novel findings.
Similar European projects are already initiated, like
EURO-MOMO monitoring the excess mortality and
ECDC I-MOVE monitoring the influenza vaccine effect-
iveness [29-32]. This will require revision and harmonisa-
tion of the pandemic preparedness plans, which has to be
elaborated in the inter-pandemic period.
Conclusion
The labour-intensive design of the FF100 cases and con-
tact approach resulted in a limited recruitment. However
the findings of our study were supplementary to those of
case based studies and important to guide control activ-
ities, to underpin policy decisions, and for communica-
tion. Our study showed an increased risk for symptomatic
infection in cases with underling non-respiratory disease,
a protective effect of frequent hand washing and a sec-
ondary transmission rate of about 20%. To increase time-
liness and power during future pandemics we suggest
pooling the key epidemiological, clinical, virological and
immunological data for both the first few hundred cases
and their close contacts of several countries, to make it
possible to collect the required data in a relatively short
time period. Collaborative pooling of the data from several
countries may significantly increase the scientific and pub-
lic health utility of the FF100 approach.
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